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EXPORT  CREDITS  AND  THE  EUROPEAN  EXPORT  BANK 
Export  credits is a  subject which  combines  great technical 
complexity  with  considerable political importance.  Such issues are 
particularly difficult to handle  in the  Connnunity  because  the 
technical content  gets  in the way  of the political issues. 
Export  credits matter politically because  they  are part of  the 
Community's  Common  Corrnnerc:Lal  Policy. 
the discipline of the internal market. 
com'non  external tariff.  He  cannot/leave 
For  our internal  trade~  1.ve  have 
For  our  imports,  we  have  the 
our  exports out  of the 
Community picture.  Yet  export  credits is one area where  our progress 
has  been  slow.  Indeed  the  competition between our member  states has 
got vJOrse,  as monetary instability,  inflation and balance of  payments 
problems  have  led  some  of  them  to  an  even more  aggressiv~ approac~ 
than  they pursued previously. 
But  as we  come  out  of  the recession,  we  now  have  an easier 
climate in ,vhich  to  do  something about  this.  That  is why  I  welcome 
the  attention 1.,;hi  ~:h  ym_n  Committee  is giving to  these problems  in the 
three reports which we  are  talking about  today  - Mr  Coust~'s Report 
on Aid  to  Exports,  Mr  Nyborg's  Report  on  the  European  Export  Bank 
and  Mr  Spicer's Report  on  the  Community's  Competence  in External 
Economic Relations. 
Let me  begJ n  'Jith  the  problem of  export  credits. 
In the  1960s  the main  thrust of our  efforts was  directed to 
the  problem of  credit insurance,  and  specifically to  harmonising its 
conditioitS  and  coveragee  Despite  long discussions little progress 
vJaS  made.  In  1973  the  Cormnission  decided to try  a  new  approach.  I  am 
glad  to  say  that h"e  are making  some  head\·Jay  - ~ve hope  to  submit  a 
formal  proposal  in this area in the autumn. 
But  the distortions of  competition  from  different practices of 
credit insurance are 1:-tO\.;'ever  now  as nothing  compared "Iilith  other  fol-ms 
of  competition.  The  economic uncertainties of the  1970s  have  led 
several member  states to  erect or  improve  a  battery of  export  credit 
facilities to  hel.p  thcil_- e:h-porters  - guarantees against inflation, 
mixtures  of  ai.d  zmd  con;mercial  credits,  provision of  export  finc.tnce 
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on  increasingly  favourable  terms both in respect of interest 
rates and  in respect  of  length of credit.  Something of an 
export credit race has  developed  between our member  states in 
their relations ''7i th  Eastern European  countries,  notably  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Poland;  the tax payers  of certain member  states 
are,  in effect,  vying 1;-;rith  each  other) to help  the Eastern 
'  Europeans.  \~ith current  levels of inflation,  these measures  of 
'competition may  produce  a  situation in which our  tax payers 
are being  asked  to provide  the funds  simply  to  give  the products 
of  our industry  m"'ay. 
The  Commission has  been  trying to  do  something about  the 
export  credit problem for  some  years. 
- In  the  1960s  the  Commission  got  agreement  on  a 
procedure  by  1vhich  our member  states 
consult  each  other about  credits being 
provided for  terms  longer  than five years. 
But  this procedure is of  limited use, 
since it does  not  bind  the member  states 
to  accept any  limits  - merely  to  consult. 
- Consequently  in 1971  we  made  a  proposal 
on  interest rates,  but it found little favour. 
- In  1972  we  also  sought  to harmonise  the 
so-called cost  escalation guarantees 
,.;hich were  also beginning to  increase 
in  importance.  This  proposal  likewise 
fell  on  deaf  ears.  But  we  have  been 
keeping up  the pressure and we  recently 
signed a  ne'\.\7  proposal  to the  Council 
on  this  subject. 
Competition in the  export  credit field goes wider  than  the 
Community,  to  involve all the main industrial trading countries. 
We  therefore  ,,~elcomed the  search for  a  "Gentleman's Agreement" 
between the  Community  on  the one  hand  and  the United States and 
Japan  on  the otber \vhich  be-gan  in 1973.  For  two  years  from 
1973-197  5,  there 11ere  negotiations  to  reach an  agreement,  and  \ve 
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managed  to  get  a  large measure of accord  on  the peripheral 
aspects.  But  on  the central  questions of  (a)  lengths  of 
credit and  (b)  rates of interest,  it proved  impossible to 
the gap  bet\veen  the  Community  and  the United States.  And 
',at  this  stage  France did 
'such had  a  role  to play. 
\ 
not accept  1that  the  Community  as 
I 
bridge 
even 
So  the  idea of an agreement with the  Community  ran  into  the  sand. 
However,  at the Rambouillet meeting last year,  those present agreed 
to try again,  and  the talking recommenced  outside the  Community. 
In the  spring  a  consensus  was  reached between these countries, 
and  last week  they  separately announced  that  they would apply  a 
consensus  from  the 1st July.  This  consensus  amounts  to  no  more 
than a  very  limited agreement,  the  lo1vest  cormnon  denominator  of 
minimlliTI  rates of interest and maximum  lengths of credit. 
Horeover it is not binding.  Nevertheless  after three years of 
disagreement,  even  such  a  limited measure  as  this is better than 
nothing,  and  the  Comrnis sian '·7elcomes  the fact  that . some  basis for 
agreement  has  been obtained.  A basis which  opens  up  the possibility 
of  subsequent  further  improvement. 
But  vJhat  is happening in all this  to  the question of the 
Cornrnunity's  competence? 
In the  Commission  1 s  vie'l.v  there is no  doubt  about  this.  The 
Treaty of Rome  clearly regards  export  credits as  a  matter of 
CO!Thllercial  policy  - and  as  such  a  matter of  exclusive  Community 
competence. 
But  some  of our member  states have  been very  reluctant  to accept 
this.  They  have  argued  either for  a  mixed  competence which Hould 
give  them  a  bigger  say,  or for  no  competence at all - on  the 
spurious  grounds  that until  economic  and  monetary union is 
achieved no  Community  common  action is possible in this field. 
Hmvever,  in the  face  of all this,  our  Court  of Justice has 
dearly  and unequivocably upheld  the  Commission 1s  general 
interpretation.  The  Commission  cannot  ignore its role of guardian 
of the Treaties.  We  have  been anxious  not  to make  it more 
difficult to  get  a  Gentleman 1s  Agreement  by  stressing solely these 
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{) legal aspects,  and  have  bent  over  backwards  to  be  flexible  over 
procedural  questions.  But  've  have  had  to  insist that any  con:,;ensus 
in the  context of the Gentleman's  Agreement  should be  put  inf.·o 
effect only  by  a  Council  decision~  This  approach  has,  I  regret  to 
say,  been rejected by  one member  state. 
\-Jhat  then  i.s  the  situation?  \-Je  have  the basis  for  an  agreement 
which,  if limited,  is better than nothing and  should be built on 
for  the future.  On  the other hand,  it has  to  be accepted that 
export  credits are  a  Cormnunity matter.  The  Cormnission will  no''' have 
to decide what  to do,  so  as  not  to  make  things worse,  yet protect 
the interests of  the  Community. 
We  have  to  resolve this problem,  for failure to  agree  on 
Community  competence  prevents progress  on many  aspects of  export 
credits within  the  Community.  It also makes  it very difficult 
for  the  Community  to  play  a  part in the  OECD  - \vhere useful  vJork · 
can  be  done  in respect,  for  example,  of aircraft and nuclear  pov1er 
stations.  In addition,  we  must  continue  to  press  ahead  in other 
matters.  There  are other major distortions of  competition  - and 
notably  cost escalation schemes.  The  existing consultation procedures 
1 
must  be maintained  and  improved.  The  harmonisation of  conditions of 
credit  insurance must  be  pursued. 
Of  course  such  a  progra~ne of work bristles with technical 
as well  as political difficulties.  We  could  easily add  to our 
programme  by  seeking to deal with other distortions.  But  this 
area is  so politically sensitive that  I  do  not  think there is any 
point in taking  on  too much.  As  the  Court  of Justice recognised 
in its recent  opinion,  the  fact  of  the matter is that the removal 
of distortions  can only be  achieved progressively.  What  we  have 
to  do  is to keep up  the pressure.  This  is a  classical  case of 
national interests conflicting Hith the  Community  interest in such 
a  \vay  that not  only  Community  interest is harmed  but  also  the 
real national interest is being damaged.  The  Commission  is doing 
\·Jhat  it can to  make  the  Community  view prevail  - and  the  help  and 
support of the  Parliament will be  crucial to  our  success. 
I  turn no\v  to  the  question of  the  European  Export  Bank. 
The_principle underlying  the proposal  for  a  European  Export  Bank 
i.s  very  simple. 
National  exporters  acting on their own,  or 
in conjunction lvith  other  firms  of  the  same - 5  -
nationality  are already  covered  by 
national  arrangements. 
- But  consortia of  companies  from  more  than 
one member  state are not. 
The  Cormnunity  should,  therefore,  create an  instrument  by which 
such  Community  consortia  can  be given a  single export  credit 
guarantee  to  cover  the whole deal.  This  single export  credit 
guarantee is the essential feature of our  concept,  for it will 
provide a  basis  on which  finance  can  be raised on  the market. 
The  proposed  bank  could also provide  a  part of the  finance if 
this were desired.  In this way  - and  only in this way  - can 
Community  exporters  be  put  on  an  equal  footing with their American 
and  Japanese  competitors. 
I  believe in this  idea not  only because  I  think it will  be 
of  considerable practical benefit  to  our exporters  over the decades 
ahead  - decades  in which  the nt@ber  and  size of  large capital projects 
is bound  to  inc:r ease as  the  dc~_;elopment of the third world  accelerate:::~ 
I  also  believe  in it because it is a  \vay  to put  flesh  and 
blood  onto  the  concept  of  the  Community. 
We  need  to  promote  large  scale transnational  operations within the 
Co~munity not  only  because  they  represent the most  rational and 
most  logical use of  scarce  economic  resources  but also  because  they 
8  give reality to  the  idea  of  the  Community  as  a  coherent  and 
cohesive force  in the world.  If we  are to have  the kind of 
international  strength and  international personality which we  are 
seeking we  must  d0'velop  the  necessary  ins·truments  - and  among  those 
instruments,  I  believe that  the  proposed  European  Export  Bank 
should have  a  place. 
It is in this  light  that  I  hope  that you  in this  Committee, 
and  eventually the Parliament as  a  \-Jhole  ·will  think about  our 
proposal.  I  understand  the hesitations  and doubts which  some  of you 
feel about  the  idea of  a  ne11  Community  instrument,  especially one 
which would  have  to act  on  a  considerable scale if it is going  to 
achieve anything at all. 
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The  plain fact  is  that we will not  achieve•  our  ohjvcl  .i.\'f' 
merely  by  harmonising  the  :-tction of  the  sepnrntc  ll<llional  in~;l i t11Uons. 
What  I  have  sc:d.d  ~dx1ut  export  credits in  gc1H'r·:1l  ~dHn::.  h~'"'  V\T'. 
harmonisation  can  remove  distortions of  competition it does  not  -
and  cannot  - remove  the national  limitations by which  the national 
institutions are inevitably bound.  So  long as  our action is confined 
to purely national institutions a  contract  between  a  third-country 
buyer and  a\three-company  consortia in three different  Community 
countries would  require negotiations 1.vith  three  separate institutions -
negotiations which would  almost  certainly founder.on many  technical 
problems,  for  example  of  hcn·l  to  divide  the possible losses when it is 
not  certain who  has  caused  a  default.  Only  a  Community  instlLnnent. 
can  resolve these practical difficulties and  promote  that  psychological 
sea-change vJhich  is necessary if our  companies  are to  think  European 
rather  than merely  thinking national. 
It is because  this psychological  sea-change has  not yet  taken 
place that it is very difficult to  quantify  the need  for  a  nevJ 
Community  instrurnent of this  sort.  \.Je  are talking about  the 
development  of a  new  category of business  - a  category of business 
in 1vhich our  firms  deal  less  than adequately at present.  But  let us 
look at it from  the other end.  There  is now  a  marked  shift of 
rnor.e. 
resources  to  the developing world.  This will lead to  many~projects 
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of the kind  for  \•Jhich  consortia offer the best  competition.  r 
we  are to  let American  and  Japanese  companies  have  a  competitive  f 
Unless 
advantage over our firms,  we  must  provide a  Community  instru.TTient  ~ 
to help  them.  Let us  also note  the  judgment of our  Community  industries  1· 
and  of our rivals.  UNICE  has  given  the idea of an export bank  a 
firm welcome.  They  have underlined that the  Community  "must  act 
; 
as  a  single  economic  entity able  to offer potential buyers"  ~ 
straightforward uniform  terms.  The  American  EXIH  Bank  has  clearly  r 
shown  its concern  that  even  a  limited range of  Community  exporters 
should  be  given access  to  a  capacity  comparable  to their own. 
The  Iuropean Export  Bank would  be  a  new  instrument  for  a 
new  purpose.  It vlOuld  not  compete with national institutions or 
commercial  banl<:s. 
••.  I ..• 
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At  the margin  there will of  cour~e tend to  be  some  blurring of 
coverage  between national  institftions and  the  proposed  Bank. 
But  this 1-vill  only  be marginal.  1  The  European  Export  Bank will not 
~im to  touch  the vast majority  o~ business  - which must  remain purely 
I 
national. 
I 
i 
And  so  far as  the  COIThllercial  ban~<S are concerned,  there is no 
prospect of competition developipg•) 
I  . 
~  of-~l~;-Eu~o-~:~~ Export  ~ank is essentially to  provide 
i  - export  credit  guarantees.  It may  also provide part of the  finance, 
but in so  far as  it succeeds  in  ~pening up  new  business,  it Hill 
be giving the  commercial  banks ir whole or in part new  opportunities 
to  provide finance. 
! 
! 
role of  thel European 
I  Investment  Bank?  It  Wnat  about  the 
might  be argued  that 
to  do  the work. 
we  do  not nred a  EEB  when we  have an EIB 
i 
But  in fact  the work  is not  the  ~arne:  the  Investment  Bank  deals 
with  investment  finance  inside ahd outside the  Corrmmnity,  sometimes 
acting as _the  Community's  agent  ~or the provision of  subsidisE.rl.  finance 
I 
outside the  Community.  But  thisl function is not  the  same  as  that of 
I 
export credit guarantees,  the  ma~n featu~e of the export bank's 
activities. 
I 
Moreover  the  EIB  has  been  given  ~ large degree of  independence,  as 
is appropriate  to its role as  ani  investment  bank.  It falls outside 
the normal  process  of  Community  recision-making and  outside the 
normal  process of accountability! to  Parliament.  This  sort of 
independence \vould not  be  approp~iate for· the management  of the 
export  credit guarantee aspects  ~f the  Common  Commercial  Policy. 
In each of our member  states,  stkte support  for  export credits is 
I 
rightly subject  to  the  control  o~ the national Parliament.  And 
this must  surely also  be  so  at the level of  the  Community. 
! 
This  said,  hov-1ever,  there may  bel  a  role for  the  Investment  Bank  to 
I  act as  the agent  of the  Export  Bfink  in some  respect,  to  avoid 
'I 
wasteful duplication for  example! in respect of financing. 
I  have kept  these  remarks  to  questions of principle.  There 
are many  technical  issues  on  v.;hi~h  I  know  you will wish  to  comment, 
on which we  \•Jill  do  our  best to help,  and  \vhich must  form  part of 
your overall  judgmenL  B<Jt  let  ~s keep  these in proportion.  vJe  -.,...,________  ---..1.------) 
i 
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are still at the  start of  a  long  plrocess:  if this  Committee  and  the 
I 
Parliament are prepared  - as  I  hople  - to  give  a  not unfavourable 
.  ! 
opinion,  the proposal still has  tol  run  the gauntlet of the member 
states' experts.  ~ve  are of  course! ready  to  consider  any  constructive 
comments.  But  \ve  need first to  delcide  above all whether the  idea 
I 
is worth this detailed effort$  I  lhope  your  judgement will be  positive. 
i 
I  apologise for  the  fact  thalt this has  been  a  long  and  rather 
complex exposition,  and  I  am  sure lthat  the  Committee i:vill  agree that 
I  should not  now  embark at full  l~ngth on  the  equally  complex  question 
I 
of the  Community's  external  conunericial  competence which  is  the  subject 
of Mr  Spicer's report.  I 
I 
But  I  understand that  the  t~or of your discussion of this  topic 
I 
provides  a. suitable note of  gener~l conclusion,  in stressing that  the 
I 
weakness  of  our  commercial  compet1nce is not  lack of  a  legal basis but 
want  of political will.  In  the e4port  credit field,  we  have  the  legal 
basis we  need  to  improve  the  Conunu(nity's  facilities in the  export 
I 
credit  fi~ld with  the  European  Ex~ort Bank,  and  to  remove  distortions 
to  competition.  Hhat  bas  bee·a  sin!gularly lacking is political \vi.ll. 
Yet  we must  press  ahead.  In the  C~mmunity the way  in which  common 
action is achieved is only if firslt pressure for it builds up  from 
I 
many  quarters  and  on many  points  algainst  the resistance of the member 
I 
st:ates.  This  can be  a  long  and  thlankless  process.  But  at  some 
I 
moment  in the uncertain  future.th~ dam  bursts and  common  action 
becomes  possible.  The  Commission  ~ill maintain the pressure until 
that moment  comes.  And  in this vJe
1 
will need the help of the 
Parliament. 
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